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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-THE

PASSPORT ACT OF

1926 IM-

POSING AREA RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL IS NOT AN IMPROPER
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, NOR DOES IT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF TRAVEL. Zemel

v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct.

1271 (1965).

Louis Zemel's application for passport validation for travel
to Cuba was refused by the Department of State. In an action
against the Secretary of State and Attorney General for an injunction
and a declaratory judgment that section 215 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952' and section 211(a) of the Passport Act
of 19262 are unconstitutional and that the Secretary's regulations
restricting travel to Cuba are invalid, a three-judge District Court
for the District of Connecticut upheld the Secretary's determination?
On appeal from a summary judgment for the defendants, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren for the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of
State had statutory authority under the Passport Act of 1926 to
impose area restrictions on travel; that the statue did not involve
an improper delegation of legislative power; and that the exercise
of the authority did not violate appellant's constitutional right of
travel.
The concept of freedom of travel was embodied in the Magna
Carta.' Although the Constitution makes no mention of this freedom, the values envisaged in the concept became part of the American tradition at the time of independence. Article IV of the Articles
' Section 215 provides:
a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any
national emergency proclaimed by the President, . . . and the President
shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions
and prohibitions . . .be imposed upon the departure of persons from and
their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be
unlawful....
b) After such proclamation . . . has been made and published and
while such proclamation is in force, it shall, . . . be unlawful for any
citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart
from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport. 66 Stat.
190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
2 ,T]he
Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, . . . under such rules as
the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States,
and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports." 44 Stat. 887
(1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
3 Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1964).
4 [I]t shall be lawful in future for anyone ... to leave the Kingdom and return...
except for a short period in timc of war. ..
Chapter 42 of the Magna Carta of
1215, as quoted from Jaffe, The Right to Travel, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17, 19
(1956).
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of Confederation guaranteed the freedom of travel between the
states.' This right of travel within the United States was later
upheld by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions.'
Originally, the passport concept involved governmental permission to enter or leave a port or harbor, and was gradually extended
to include generally permission of egress and of passage.' In international law, passports came to be recognized as letters of protection
or safe conduct issued by the host country.' In the United States,
the passport operated simply as a document of identity. It was not
a prerequisite to entry, to departure, or to remaining in the country.!
While possession of a passport facilitated travel abroad, it was not
a necessity, and a traveler could well get along without one. This,
as will be shown, was the case, with war-time exceptions, until
1941.10

In 1856 Congress enacted a statute granting the Secretary of
State power to issue passports "under such rules as the President
shall designate and prescribe."" That act, as amended,12 remains
effective today as the basic authority establishing the discretionary
power of the President to promulgate rules and regulations governing passport issuance"3 and is the statutory authorization focused
on by the court in the principal case. Congress, in 1918, passed a
statute which prohibited departure from or entry into the United
States without a valid passport during wartime or upon a presidential finding of necessity by proclamation.14 During World War I
the statute became operative through a proclamation by President
5 Article IV provided that, "[T]he people of each state shall have free ingress and
regress to and from any other state ..
"
6Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900) ; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
7
HUNT, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT 3 '(1898).
8 Ibid.
0 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL
19; 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (1942) ; see also Urtetiqui
v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835). In Urtefiqui the Supreme Court, in
discussing the nature of an American passport, declared:
There is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issuing of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or
declaring their legal effect . . . It is a document, which, from its nature
and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request,
that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and it is to be considered
rather in the character of a political document, by which the bearer is
recognized, in foreign countries, as an American citizen; and which, by
usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact. 34 U.S.
at 699.
10Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252.
11 Act of Aug. 8, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52.
12
REV. STAT. § 4075 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 211 (1964).
13 Note 2 supra.
14 Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559.
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Wilson 5 and was rendered inoperative when the war was officially
declared at an end. 8 During World War II, the 1918 Act was reenacted to become operative in time of war or proclamation of
national emergency. 7 A presidential proclamation made this reenactment operative. 8 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 repealed the revived 1918 statute, but retained similar provisions requiring passports for foreign travel "when the United
States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency
proclaimed by the President . .""
'. The national emergency proclaimed by President Truman during the Korean conflict' made
the statute operative and it remains in effect today, requiring a
passport for travel abroad.
A common assumption during the early history of passports
was that the Secretary of State had absolute discretion with regard
to the issuance of passports and that his decision was not subject
to judicial review." In the 1950's, however, a series of cases challenging the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952' were decided
by the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia establishing the requirements that individuals applying
for passports must be afforded both procedural' and substantive'
due process. In these decisions the right to travel was described
variously as an attribute of "personal liberty''' and as a "natural
right."2 Regardless of how described, the right to travel was con15Proclamation No. 1473, 40 Stat. 1829-31 (1918).
18 Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
17Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252.
18Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
19 Note 2 supra.
20 Proclamation No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489'(1953).
21See e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (Miss Elg, born in the United States
of Swedish parents, had her passport revoked by the State Department on the ground
that she was not an American citizen. Although the Court declared her a citizen, they
refused to compel the Secretary of State to issue the passport); Miller v. Sinjen,
289 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1923). In Miller the court said:
[Al finding that Plaintiff had ceased to be a citizen of the United
States was not necessary to the action of the State Department in denying
him a passport, for the reason that the granting of a passport by the United
States is, and always has been a discretionary matter. . . . 289 Fed. at 394.
See also 61 YALE L. J. 171 (1951), for a discussion of other denials by the Secretary in the exercise of his unrestrained discretion.
22Note 1 supra.
23 Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed,
225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
24 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955) which held that arbitrary
action by Secretary of State in denying a passport does not satisfy the requirements
of due process of law.
2 Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 7(D.D.C. 1952).
2 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955), wherein the court stated:
"The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit,
is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under
the law."
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sidered a liberty within the purview of the fifth amendment 7 and as
such was to be afforded the protections of substantive and procedural
due process; that is, not only did the method of restraint on travel
have to be fair and appropriate, but the content of executive criteria
for travel control could not be unreasonable, and the question of
reasonableness had to be considered in light of the high character
of the liberty sought to be restrained.
Prior to the principal case, the freedom to travel abroad had
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in two important
decisions, Kent v. Dulles28 and Aptheker v. Secretary of State."
Though Kent was concerned with the authority delegated to the
Secretary of State, the Court identified the right stating that it is a
part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment, and therefore it may not be infringed without due process of law." Kent
involved the denial of passports under authority of section 51.135,31
augmented by section 51.142, 32 of the passport regulations, whereby
either an admission of present membership or refusal to take an
oath with respect to past or present membership in the Communist
Party resulted in automatic denial of a passport. Kent, having
refused to take the oath, brought an action to declare the regulations
unauthorized and invalid as infringing his first amendment freedoms of speech and association and as depriving him of his liberty
without due process of law. Rather than decide these constitutional
issues, the Court preferred to construe the statutes involved narrowly,33 holding that neither the Passport Act of July 1926"4 nor
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195215 "delegate to the
Secretary the kind of authority"3 he had exercised. The Court in
Kent concerned itself only with interpreting the express powers
granted by Congress to the Secretary of State and did not consider
the extent of Congress' constitutional powers to restrict travel.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State37 the Court was directly confronted with the constitutional limits of travel restrictions occasioned
2 See Fahy, The Right to Travel, 6 NATURAL L.F. 109 (1961).
-357 U.S. 116 (1958).
29378 U.S. 500 (1964).
30

Kent v.Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).

3122 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952).
3217 Fed. Reg. 8014 (1952).
3Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958); accord, Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144

(1958).
34Note 2 supra.
35Note 1 supra.
3
6 Kent

v.Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958).

37378 U.S. 500 (1964).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

by the requirements of national security. 8 Petitioners Aptheker and
Flynn, admittedly active members of the Communist Party, were
notified that their passports were being revoked under authority of
section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 making
it illegal for all members of registered communist organizations
to use or attempt to use passports."9 In a declaratory judgment
blocking the Secretary of State's action of revocation, Justice Goldberg, citing first amendment precedents,"0 declared section 6 unconstitutional because it "too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the
right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the
fifth amendment."' 1 The significance of Aptheker lies in its seeming
application of first amendment rules' to a case involving the right
to travel, a right that arises inferentially out of the "liberty" guaranteed in the fifth amendment 3 and not out of the first amendment."
This decision has been interpreted to imply that, even though the
right to travel is protected by the fifth amendment, it is such an
important right that statutes restricting it should be scrutinized
under first amendment tests.' A more conservative reading of
Aptheker would emphasize the relation between travel and the first
amendment, thereby avoiding the pronouncement of a new constitutional doctrine. This construction can be postulated on the majority's observation that "freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty
closely related to rights of free speech and association," ' and the
Id. at 505.
39 64 Stat. 993 (1951), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1951).
40 378 U.S. at 508.
41
Id. at 505.
42 See Justice Clark's dissent noting the differences in testing a statute for vagueness
between cases arising under the first amendment and cases arising under the fifth
amendment. Id. at 521.
43 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ; CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 188-98 (1956): In Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955), Judge Fahy of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia speaks of the right to travel as a "natural right" guaranteed by the
fifth amendment.
44 Contra, Judge Wyzanski, Chief Judge of the District Court of Massachusetts, has
written that the freedom of expression and communication involved in travel are
facets of freedom of speech. Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, Atlantic Monthly, 66,
68 (Oct. 1952). "The right to travel could be treated as a facet of free expression
and communication under the First Amendment ..
" 57 MICH L. REV. 119, 120-21
(1958). American Civil Liberties Union views the freedom of travel as an integral
element of the first amendment. Hearings on S. 2770, 3998, 4110, 25.4137 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1958).
"The Committee . . . believes that this freedom of travel is a right closely related
to first amendment freedoms and that it accordingly should be denied only when
its free exercise would dangerously impinge upon national interests of the most
pressing urgency." 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF TE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEr YORK,
FREDOM TO TRAVEL 35.
4Comment, 78 HAsv. L. REV. 195, 196-98 (1964).
46 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
38
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fact that section 6, by making membership in a "communist organization" grounds for passport denial, directly infringed the first
amendment freedom of association." Regardless which reading is
given the decision, Aptheker clearly indicated that, even if a federal
statute giving the Secretary of State the power to deny passports is
precise, it must be drawn narrowly so as not unduly to infringe the
citizen's right to travel.
Both Kent and Aptheker concerned restrictions placed on indi-

viduals or groups because of their political beliefs or associations.
In Zemel v. Rusk," however, the entire citizenry is restricted in the
exercise of their right to travel. The ban on travel to Cuba does not
depend on individual beliefs or associations; rather, it depends on
foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." On this basis,
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a six-man Court majority, factually distinguished the principal case from Kent and Aptheker and
upheld the Secretary of State's right to impose area restrictions on
travel .'

The first issue resolved by the Court in Zemel was whether the
Secretary of State was statutorily authorized by Congress to refuse
to validate the passports of United States' citizens for travel to
Cuba. 1 Chief Justice Warren noted that the Secretary, acting under
the authority granted by Congress in the Passport Act of 1926,52
had restricted travel to Ethiopia, Spain and China in the 1930's, and

later to many communist countries" and by not acting, Congress
implicitly approved such administrative practices. 4
The Court rejected appellant's assertion that he was being
denied rights guaranteed by the first amendment by reasoning that
47

1d. at 518.

4885

Sup. Ct. 1271 (1965).

49d.

at 1279.

50 Area restrictions on travel arising out of a State Department requirement of passport

validation for travel to "Albania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea and
Viet-Nam under Communist control" (33 Dep't State Bull. 77 n. 3 (1955))
were judicially challenged in a trilogy of cases dealing with individuals wishing to
travel to Communist China. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia upheld the right to impose area restriction in three separate cases
involving a scholar, a newspaperman, and a congressman. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in all three cases. Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959) ; Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
51
Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1274 (1965).
5244 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1965).
53
Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1276-79 (1965).
HThe Court did not decide whether section 210 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (Note 1 supra) and the still outstanding presidential proclamation of
national emergency pursuant thereto (Note 20 supra) would alone be sufficient to
make travel in violation of the area restriction unlawful. Ibid.
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the diminishing of a citizen's opportunity to gather information,
though to be considered in determining whether appellant was
denied due process of law, is simply not a first amendment right.5
In the words of the Chief Justice: "The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.""0
Instead, the right to travel allegedly denied appellant was treated
as a "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment and "the fact that
a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not
mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited."5 Determining that the requirements of due process are a function "of the
extent of the necessity for the restriction,"" the Court answered the
fifth amendment issue by deciding that the interest of the government in precluding the involvement of "the nation in dangerous
international incidents"59' that "might" be caused by American citizens traveling to Cuba outweighed the interests of passport applicants in freedom of travel. Added to the government's side of the
scale was the fact that the Executive has the right to take all steps
necessary, except an act of war, to protect the rights of American
citizens in foreign countries."
Finally, the Court decided that the Passport Act of 1926 does
contain "sufficiently definite standards" for the formulation of
travel restrictions when it is considered that "Congress in giving the
Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs must of necessity
paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
61
areas."
The Court placed critical reliance on factually distinguishing
Zemel from Kent and Aptheker, but the distinctions may be superficial. It is true that a more or less general ban on travel to a
particular country has an impact different from that of denying
particular individuals the right to travel anywhere outside the
country. Thus the justification for, and the consequences of, the
power to restrict passport use through area restrictions presents a
different question from the passport denial problems in Kent and
Aptheker. However, the right of free movement is the constitutional
value being regulated; the only difference is the manner and degree
of the restriction.
55

Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1281 '(1965).

56

Ibid.

5785 Sup. Ct. at 1279.

58 Ibid.
5985 Sup. Ct. at 1280.
60REv. STAT. § 2001 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
6185 Sup. Ct. at 1281.
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The passport regulations invalidated in Kent and Aptheker
were alleged to be necessary to forestall the adverse effects on foreign
countries of travel by political dissenters. This extranational context
would seem analogous to that of the principal case. Moreover, it
is difficult to rationalize why the presidential authority over matters
of foreign affairs should be limited by the rights of the political
dissenter to hold nonconforming opinions and not limited by the
right to develop those opinions.
Kent and Aptheker hold that travel cannot be restricted for
mere belief or association; yet the authority upheld in Zemel -to
impose area bans with exceptions - permits this very thing in those
areas of the world where the Secretary deems travel by American
citizens inimical to government interests. The Secretary can, by
changing the number of nations to which travel is precluded and by
changing the excepted class of persons for whom travel to such
nations is permitted, approach the absolute discretionary control
over travel that the Court held violative of the Constitution in Kent.
It has been argued that intelligent electoral judgment on foreign
affairs is a function of the availability of informed viewpoints from
sources independent of the federal government,"2 i.e., knowledge is
an element of a voter's judgment; he should be free to learn firsthand. Authorization of area restrictions with exceptions permits
the Executive to grant passports to those favorable to Administration
policy and to deny passports to critics, thereby undermining the democratic process which the guarantees of free inquiry were intended
to preserve.63 Such curtailment of free investigation necessarily
results in a substantial diminution of the opportunity to arrive at an
intelligent judgment and would seem to infringe on the appellant's
first amendment rights contrary to the pronouncements of the Court
in the principal case.
Zemel was primarily concerned with the power of the President
to restrict travel as a necessary part of his constitutional duty to
control foreign relations - but more was involved because a basic
liberty of a citizen was being curtailed. Where the exercise of the
6

CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 195-96
(1956):
Each inroad upon the freedom of travel weakens the base upon which
free society necessarily depends. Unless the citizenry has at least access to
the available fund of information with which to test for itself the soundness of governmental decisions, the structure of a free society is impaired.
The right to know and the right to travel represent freedoms long taken
for granted by Ameicans. 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO

2See

STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 37.

63See Pollitt and Rauh, Restrictions on the Right to Travel, 13 W. REs. L.
(1961).

REV.
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President's foreign relations power touches personal liberties, it is
subject to the due process clause of the fifth amendment." In Kent,
the Supreme Court said due process requires that any new regulation
of the right to travel should come from Congress. "5 Zemel involved
no regulation pursuant to new Congressional legislation; the statute
relied on in Zemel is the same as that narrowly construed by the
Court in Kent."
The finding in the principal case of Congressional authorizations of area restrictions does an injustice to the Kent approach to
statutory construction. There the Supreme Court strictly construed
the Passport Act of 192667 and found no established prior administrative practice of denying passports on the basis of individual
beliefs sufficiently substantial to warrant the conclusion of implied
legislative approval." There seem to be even fewer instances of
administratively-imposed area restrictions prior to 1926; they appear
explicitly for the first time in a 1938 Presidential authorization to
the State Department." It is difficult to attribute to Congress a
silent acceptance of a policy that was not applied on any widespread
scale before 1952.0 It is particularly difficult in view of the fact
that following the Court's decision in Kent, President Eisenhower
asked Congress for authority to impose area restrictions" and Congress has thus far failed to grant such authority."
Even if legislative intent can validly be imputed by Congressional failure to act in the face of administrative interpretation, the
fact that the Court recognized the constitutional rights involved
should necessitate that the challenged authorization be pursuant to
express Congressional legislation as recognized by Justice Black in
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Shachtman v.
Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
65 The Supreme Court found that if the right of travel is "to be regulated, it must be
pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958).
6644 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1926).
6United

6T

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1952).

8

6 1d. at 128.

69 Exec. Order No. 7856 3 Fed. Reg. 687 (1938).
70 See

1958

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY

PASSPORT PROCEDURES

Pollitt and Rauh,
Restrictions on the Right to Travel, 13 W. Rs. L. REV. 1128 (1962).
(T~he Secretary should have clear statutory authority to prevent Americans from using passports for travel to areas where there is no means of
protecting them, or where their presence would conflict with our foreign
policy objcctives or be inimical to the security of the United States. 104
CoG.REC. 13046 (1958).
A search of U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS has revealed
no such Congressional grant of authority.
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL;

71

7
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his dissent in Zemel." A number of studies have been made of the
statutes, regulations and procedures involved in the processing of
passports,74 and most of these have recommended that, at the very
least, the discretionary authority given the Secretary in issuing passports should be specifically defined.75
In theory, area prohibitions on travel apply equally to all
American citizens, and no constitutional problems based upon the
reasonableness of classification, or discrimination against classes,
groups, or individuals are raised under the fifth amendment, provided the action is not so arbitrary as to be wholly capricious. However, in most cases where the Department of State has invoked area
restrictions, they have also made numerous exceptions for persons
whose travel is found to be in the national interest.7" Unanswered
in Zemel is whether such exceptions themselves should be held
discriminatory and area control held invalid in those situations.
What remains of the constitutionally protected freedom of
the United States citizens to travel abroad after Zemel? It is generally conceded that reasonable limitations can be imposed on
constitutionally protected rights, but there is considerable difficulty
in defining the boundaries of appropriate restrictions. It appears
clear that the Executive does not have inherent power to regulate
the right to travel abroad. Congress does have the power to regulate
the right to travel.78 In Aptheker 9 the Supreme Court stated that the
73

74

Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1282 (1965). Generally, when the President
needs additional powers to carry out legitimate policies of the government, the
customary approach is through special purpose legislation. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWER, 191-92 (4th ed. 1957).
See e.g., CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 162-213
(1956);

1957 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
SECURITY; 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM
TO TRAVEL.
75 "Congress should enact legislation defining the standards and criteria of the passport
security program." 1957 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY at 475. "[Tjhe Committee has concluded, on balance, that the

authority to prohibit travel by all United States citizens in areas designated by the
Secretary of State is a necessary instrument to advance the national interest, and it
recommends legislation to clear up any doubt as to the possession by the Secretary of
" 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
State of such authority ..
PASSPORT PROCEDURES

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW

YORK 55.
76 A companion press release to the Department of State's area prohibition on passport
validation for travel to Cuba provided for exceptions to "persons whose travel may
be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or
businessmen with previously established business interests." Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup.
Ct. 1271, 1274 (1965).
77 If such power exists in the Executive, it would arise out of the power to conduct
foreign affairs. Chicago and Co. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
78 The Supreme Court has found that if the right to travel is "to be regulated, it must
be pursuant to the law-making functions of the congress." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958).
79 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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proposition that Congress has power to safeguard the national
security "is obvious and unarguable."8 Zemel indicates that the
same is true of the related power of Congress to conduct foreign
affairs and that Congress, within that framework may delegate to
the Executive the power to regulate the right to travel.
Regulation of the right to travel must, however, be constitutional. Furthermore, "if that power is delegated, the standards must
be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests."'" The problem
becomes one of balancing interests and is closely related to the
similarly difficult question of determining what restraints may be
imposed on freedom of speech, a parallelism which has been recognized by the Supreme Court.82 The question of whether or not a given
regulation of the right to travel is constitutional is to be answered
by balancing the freedom to travel against the utility of the means
employed to achieve the intended purpose.3 In Kent"4 the restrictions on the individual's right to travel were not justified by their
alleged purpose. In Aptheker,85 the statute itself authorized a sweeping restriction of travel which the Court said was not justified by
the limited evil being pursued. In Zemel, the utility of area restriction on passport issuance in the administration of foreign policy
was found by the Court to outweigh the freedom to travel. The
present situation in Cuba, and possibly politically embarrassing
events which could transpire if American citizens were to travel
there, justified, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, the restriction on
the freedom to travel.
The resultant Court approach to restrictions on the right to
travel abroad seems to be to allow the Executive discretion under
present statutes by continually refusing to declare the wide statutory grant of authority to it unconstitutional, while keeping in
mind that particular exercises of the discretion might be termed
arbitrary and therefore invalid as determined by subsequent judicial
proceedings.
Ronald C. Butz
8o Id. at 509.
81

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).

82 Id.

at 509.

The test as applied by the Court to the challenged statute in Aptheker is a derivation of that used in Shelton v.Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960):
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose. 364 U.S. at 488.
84 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
85 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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RECENT DECISIONS
-

SERVICE OF PROCESS

RESIDENT MOTORIST ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

-

COLORADO NON-

Clemens v. District

Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
In Clemens v. District Court,1 the Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act' was declared unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses contained in the state and federal constitutions!
Defendant Clemens was involved in an automobile accident
in Denver while a resident of Colorado. At the time of the accident he was operating an automobile loaned to him by the owner,
defendant Bowers, a resident of South Dakota. The defendants
were served with process pursuant to the provisions of the Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act,' the substituted service being issued
from the Secretary of State's office to to Clemens' "last known address," a hotel in Tucumcari, New Mexico, and Bowers' address
in Aberdeen, South Dakota. At the time of issuance of the substituted service Clemens had changed his residence to Utah and never
received a copy of the substituted service; Bowers, however, received the copy mailed to her.
1390

P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964). The petitioners in this action will be referred to throughout as defendants, their position in trial court.
2
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-8-1 to -6 (1963).
3 The court did not specifically cite either the CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 25 or the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the defendants argued that
Colorado and Federal due process were violated by the Colorado Nonresident Motorist
Act, it must be assumed that the court was in agreement. The COLO. CONST., art. II,
§ 25 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law... ."
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963) provides:
Service of process.- When any civil action which pertains to an accident
is commenced in any court of record in this state, the court shall, upon verified motion giving the last known address of the defendant and setting forth
the circumstances by which the plaintiff is entitled to serve the secretary of
state in accordance with the provisions of this article and upon finding that
such service is proper, enter an order ex parte setting forth the last known
address of the defendant and authorizing service to be made on the secretary of state. Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process,
complaint, motion and order of court to the secretary of state, his deputy
or assistant, together with a fee of five dollars, which shall be taxed as
part of the cost of the proceedings. Notice of such service and a copy of
each instrument so served shall forthwith be sent by the secretary of state
by certified or registered mail, addressed to the defendant at his address
given in the order of court, with return receipt requested. Promptly after
such mailing the secretary of state shall file with the clerk of the court a
certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete thirty days after
service of process on the secretary of state as provided in this section.
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Within the thirty days allowed before service became final
Bowers and Clemens, whom Bowers had apparently notified, appeared and moved that service be quashed.' Upon the denial of
their motion the defendants instituted an original action before
the supreme court to obtain a rule to show cause why the service
should not be quashed.'
It was the contention of Bowers that that provision of the
Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act which defined the owner of
an automobile as a driver' exceeded the limitations of due process
in its attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over one who had
"not had sufficient affiliation or 'minimal contact' with that state
which are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.''8
Clemens contended that the attempt by the act to provide substituted service on residents of Colorado absent from the state for
ninety days" was in violation of his constitutional rights. Although
recognizing that amenability to suit during sojourns without the
state is an incident of residence or domicile within the state, Clemens
argued that residence at the time of the accident could not be
deemed conclusive of residence at the time of substituted service.
The statute construed in this manner would conflict with the
5 Since no provision for a motion to quash service of process exists in the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure it must be assumed that the motion by the defendants was
a 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person or for the insufficiency of service of process or both.
6 COLO. R. Civ. P. 106, which abolished the various forms of writs, provides in subsection (a)

(4)

for a rule to show cause.

COLO. R. Civ. P.

116(a) provides for

original jurisdiction by the supreme court and authorizes relief in the nature of
prohibition. It would appear, since the defendants entitled their petition to the
supreme court as "Complaint for order to show cause or relief in the nature of prohi-

bition," that the defendants were unsure of which rule was applicable.
7 COLO.REV.

STAT. § 13-8-1 (1963) provides:
Definition of terms. - (1) When used in sections 13-8-1 through 13-8-6,
the following terms shall have the following meanings: (2) A "driver" is
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle.

It would appear that the obvious intention of the legislature was to include owners
of vehicles who were not driving at the time of an accident within the scope of the
act. See note 17 infra for further discussion of this point.
8 Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 4, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).

9 COLO. REV.STAT. § 13-8-2 (1963) provides:
Appointment of agent by resident. - If a resident who is the driver of
a motor vehicle involved in an accident thereafter remains away from this
state for a period of ninety days, said driver shall be deemed to have
appointed the secretary of state to be his true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served process in any civil action against him pertaining to
such accident, and any such process served as provided in section 13-8-4
shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on such resident
driver personally within this state.
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principle that a state's authority to subject an absent resident to
suit ends when that resident makes his domicile or residence in
another state."0 Furthermore, the defendant argued, it would be
possible under the statute to invoke the substituted service mechanism even when the defendant could be found and personally served
within the state." For these reasons the defendant asked the court
to hold the statute unconstitutional as "arbitrary, unnecessary and
inappropriate to the object of subjecting to suit residents of Colorado absent from the state for ninety days or more.""
Both defendants further urged that Section 13-8-4"s prescribing
the method of effecting substituted service was unconstitutional
as applied to them. Since the statute did not require that the requested return receipt be filed before deeming the substituted service complete, the defendant's believed it possible for service to
be affected regardless of whether notice had been mailed to
the defendant's last known address and regardless of whether the
defendant had received notice of the suit."4 Thus, it was contended,
the statute failed to contain provisions making it reasonably probable that the defendant would receive actual notice of the suit,
and under the principle established in Wuchter v. Pizzuti"5 the
statute was in conflict with the requirements of due process.
Justice Hall, in writing the court's opinion, accepted petitioner
Bowers' contention that she had not sufficient "minimal contact"
with Colorado to warrant subjecting her to the court's jurisdiction.
Regarding that portion of the act which defined "driver" as the
' 0 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).

Although the court did not discuss the

situation suggested, i.e., that the absent defendant had sought to establish residence
or domicile in another state, it would appear that the corollary drawn by the defendant
is valid. The question would always turn, of course, upon the incidents which establish residence or domicile.
"1Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 7, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964). The
defendants relied upon the cases of Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 75 Pac.

614 (1904)

and Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890).

The

Supreme Court stated the corollary when it allowed substituted service upon a show-

ing of diligence by plaintiff in his search for a resident defendant. Jacobs v. Roberts,
223 U.S. 261 (1912).

12 Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 9, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
13COLO. REv, STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963), supra note 4.

14Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 12 at p. 9.
15276 U.S. 13, 24 (1927); The Supreme Court noted the general trend of authority

toward sustaining the validity of substituted service of process ". . . if the statutory
provisions in themselves indicate that there is reasonable probability that if the
statutes are complied with, the defendant will receive actual notice .. "
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owner or operator of the motor vehicle16 as a complete fiction,"
Justice Hall launched into a consideration of the history of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff,18 he noted, which had
limited jurisdiction to persons and property within the forum, was
no longer followed. Instead, when a state has a legitimate interest,
a nonresident can be subject to suit if he has had "certain minimal
6

1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-1(2), (1963), supra note 7.

17The obvious intent of the legislature in section 13-8-1 was to include within the scope
of the statute nonresident owners of vehicles who had consented to their use by others
in Colorado. The history of the Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act supports such
a conclusion. The original legislation establishing the act was adopted in 1937, Colo.
Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25, and was patterned after the Massachusetts Act
interpreted in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
The Colorado Supreme Court first interpreted the 1937 act in Carlson v. District
Court, 116 Colo. 330, 140 P.2d 525 (1947). The court therein construed the statute
strictly, as being in derogation of the common law and refused to allow substituted
service on a resident who, subsequent to an accident, has established his residence
in another state. In 1953 the act was challanged by Federal District Court, Larsen
v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239 (D. Colo. 1953), and Judge Knous, relying upon the
Carlson decision, strictly construed the statute as being applicable solely to those
engaged in the actual operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Two
decisions in 1954 turned upon the Carlson decision: Warwick v. District Court, 129
Colo. 300, 269 P.2d 704 (1954), and Clark v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329, 275 P.2d
952 (1954), held the act inapplicable to an operator resident at the time of an
accident but who later became nonresident before substituted service was attempted.
The decisions in these cases helped prompt legislative amendments. In 1953
the scope of the act was enlarged to include accidents occurring from the operation
of motor vehicles anywhere within the state. Colo. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 44, p. 143.
Operation of a motor vehicle within the scope of employment by agents, servants,
and other employees was deemed by the legislature in 1957 as subjecting the owner
to substituted service, Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 83, p. 143. And, finally, the act
was amended to its pre-Clemens form in 1961, Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 75, pp.
244-46.
Each time the statute was amended its scope was enlarged, and it is inconceivable that the legislature should narrow the scope of the 1957 amendment by excluding
from coverage an absent owner whose agent, servant, or employee was allowed to
operate an automobile and to inflict injuries thereby. If such reasoning is applicable
to the absence of an intent to exclude the nonresident principal, master, or employer
from the scope of the statute, it should not be difficult to define an intent to include
nonresident owners who had consented to the operation of an automobile within
Colorado by someone other than an agent, servant, or employee.
The mere fact that an owner had no contacts with Colorado did not prevent
the supreme court from upholding substituted service in Morrison v. District Court,
143 Colo. 514, 355 P.2d 660 (1960). There the court deemed the family relationship between a father and son sufficient to subject the father to substituted service
of process.
Furthermore, if the method adopted by the legislature to enhance the scope of
the statute was based upon a fiction it nevertheless attempted to remedy the unfortunate situation whereby an innocent resident of Colorado could be denied satisfaction
from certain classes of nonresident tortfeasors. Indeed, the orthodoxy professed by
the court with respect to section 13-8-1 would have been more haecceitas had it also
rejected the basic fiction that a nonresident who operates a motor vehicle in Colorado
consents to constitute the secretary of state as his agent for service of process.
18 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Therein the court stated what came to be known as the physical
power doctrine.
...every state has the power to determine for itself the civil status and
capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may
contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be
executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in
which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and
also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated
within such territory both personal and real may be acquired, enjoyed, and
transferred. [But] no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory. 95 U.S. at 722.
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contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
(Citations omitted.)' Nevertheless, the limitations on the territorial power of a state to subject a nonresident to its jurisdiction
had not been extinguished. Indeed, "However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called
upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that
State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."
(Citations omitted.) 0
Since the court had already determined as a matter of fact
that defendant Bowers had no contacts with Colorado," the only
conclusion of law which could follow was that the Act was unconstitutional: "Provisions of Chapter 75 providing for substituted
service on owners with no contacts are lacking in due process, unconstitutional and void."2 2
The court ignored Clemens' argument concerning the invalidity of section 13-8-2,' which purported to subject residents absent for ninety days from the state to substituted service of process.
It is at least unfortunate that the court failed to consider the
method adopted by the legislature to obviate the deficiences in the
1937 Act 24 which had left residents removed from the state beyond
the scope of the statute.'5
'9

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945 ).

20 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1957).

21 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 84 (Colo. 1964). The court there stated:
In the case before us, Barbara Bowers has never been a resident of Colorado; she owns a motor vehicle; she did not drive the vehicle; Clemens
drove the same for his own purposes, not as agent for Barbara or for her
benefit or in her behalf. She was not in the vehicle at the time of the accident and for all that appears in the record was not even in Colorado.
And at page 85,
The language in Chapter 75 providing for substituted service of process is broad enough to warrant resort to such service on a nonresident owner
of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in Colorado where the owner has
never been in Colorado and when the owner has no contacts or ties, minimal
or otherwise, with Colorado - the status of Barbara Bowers, defendant in
the trial court.
It is interesting to note in defendant Clemens' affidavit, which accompanied the
petition to the supreme court, the statement, "'Iwas alone in the vehicle at the
time of the accident as Barbara Ann Bowers had returned to South Dakota several
days before the accident happened." It would appear that the factual conclusion
reached by the court that Barbara Bowers had had no contact with Colorado was at
last in part erroneous. Whether the contact with Colorado which was present would
constitute sufficient "minimal contact" to warrant subjecting defendant Bowers to
the court's jurisdiction is a question to which the could should have addressed itself.
For further discussion of this point see pages 230 infra.
22 390 P.2d at 86.
23 COLO. REv.STAT. § 13-8-2 (1963), supra note 8.
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25.
v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329, 275 P.2d 952 (1954) ; Warwick v. District Court,
129 Colo. 300, 269 P.2d 704 (1954) ; Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180
P.2d 525 (1947).

25Clark
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Nevertheless, the court did not address itself to Clemens' argument before it proceeded with a discussion of the procedures prescribed by section 13-8-4"8 for effecting substituted service of process.
Justice Hall began by announcing the well established principle
that the due process associated with substituted service of process
contemplates notice of impending proceedings.2 7 No serious challenge of the constitutionality of subjecting a non-resident motorist to
the jurisdiction of the state's courts could be maintained. 8 But the
methods prescribed for effecting that jurisdiction through substituted service of process must, "in order to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable that notice of the service
will be communicated to the nonresident defendant who is sued."'
Placing particular reliance on the fact that the statute held
constitutional in Hess v. Pawloski0 provided for notice sent by
registered mail and the filing of the return receipt with the complaint, the court considered the degree of probability under the Colorado statute of notice reaching the defendant. In lVuchter"
the United States Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional a
statute which made no provision for notifying a defendant subsequent to service on the secretary of state. So also, the Maryland
supra note 4.
Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 86 (Colo. 1964).

26 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963),
27

Id. at 87. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Hess v. Pawlosk,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
2 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 86 (Colo. 1964), citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13, 48 (1927).
30274 U.S. 352 (1927). The Massachusetts statute involved in this case provided in
pertinent part:
Service of such process shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the registrar, or in his office, and
such service shall be sufficient service upon the said non-resident; provided,
that notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by
registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return
receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to
the writ and entered with declaration. MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 90, ch. 431,
§ 2 (1923).
31 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1927). The New Jersey statute provided:
From and after the passage of this act any chaffeur, operator or owner
of any motor vehicle, not licensed under the laws of the State of New Jersey,
providing for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, who shall
accept the privilege extended to nonresident chauffeurs, operators and owners
by law of driving such a motor vehicle or of having the same driven or
operated in the State of New Jersey, without a New Jersey registration or
license, shall, by such acceptance and the operation of such automobile
within the State of New Jersey, make and constitute the Secretary of State
of the State of New Jersey, his, her or their agent for the acceptance of
process in any civil suit or proceeding by any resident of the State of New
jersey against such chauffeur, operator or the owner of such motor vehicle,
arising out of or by reason of any accident or collision occurring within the
State in which a motor vehicle operated by such chauffeur, or operator, or
such motor vehicle is involved. PUBLIC LAWS N.J. ch. 232, § 1 (1924),
p. 18.
2
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Supreme Court had rejected a statute as providing insufficient probability of notice reaching the defendant where the statute deemed
as conclusive of the defendant's "last known address" the address
given by him at the time of the accident. 2 Additionally, the Colorado court construed the language of two earlier decisions, one by
the Supreme Court 3 and one by a state court,34 as requiring a method
of substituted service which would be as effectual in imparting notice as would be personal service.
Thus, the court, not unmindful that many courts had held
statutes similar to Colorado's constitutional, believed its only course
for decision was to find the methods prescribed for substituted
service invalid. Deeming the fact that Clemens had not received
notice of the impending suit as conclusive of merely fifty percent
probability that notice would actually be imparted to a prospective
defendant, the court concluded: "Procedures only fifty percent effective cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring notice to the
defendant or to constitute due process."35
From the foregoing restatement of the court's opinion it is apparent that the court accepted two of the three arguments advanced
by the defendants: that is, in its first holding, the court deemed as
unconstitutional the legislative attempt to subject a nonresident
owner of an automobile driven by a permittee to substituted service
of process; in its second holding, the court considered the act constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide reasonable probability of notice reaching the nonresident defendant." The court's
32

Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 At. 547 (1930). The Maryland statute provided:
Notice of such service and a copy of the process shall forthwith be sent
by registered mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant at his
address as specified in such process; and such address shall be conclusively
presumed to be correct if it be an address given by the defendant in any
proceeding before any court magistrate or justice of the peace, or any police
officer or deputy or any other person, at or subsequent to the collision or
accident aforesaid, or if it be the latest address appearing upon the records
of the Commission of Motor Vehicles . . . or other officer charged with the
administration of the motor vehicle laws of the State in which any motor
vehicle is registered in the name of such defendant. . . . MD. ACTS ch. 254,
(1929), cited in Grote v. Rogers, supra at 548.
33
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), cited in Clemens v. District Court, 390
P.2d 83, 89 (Colo. 1964) ; Justice Holmes stated therein:
To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to
reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial
justice is to be done. 243 U.S. at 92.
34 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944), cited in Clemens v. District
Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964). The court therein placed particular emphasis
upon the impartation of notice.
3s Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964).
36 This discussion assumes that the due process requirements would be the same regardless of whether the defendant is a nonresident or a resident absent from the state
for ninety days or more.
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holding on these two issues made it unnecessary to consider Clemens'
argument that section 13-8-2 of the Colorado Revised Statutes subjecting residents absent from Colorado for ninety days or more to
substituted service of process was unconstitutional.
I.

SERVICE ON NONRESIDENT OWNERS NOT PRESENT OR
OPERATING AUTOMOBILE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT

The statement by the court in its first holding of the law governing the degree of contact which is requisite when subjecting nonresidents to in personam jurisdiction is incapable of refutation. The
court's conclusion of fact as well as its application of law to that
conclusion of fact, however, seems poorly founded.
The major objection implicit in the court's first holding lies
in its statement of the question presented for determination; i.e.,
defendant Bowers' contention that she has not had sufficient conact with Colorado to subject her to substituted service of process. The
court stated that the question to be resolved was whether provisions
for substituted service of process on owners of automobiles who have
no contacts with Colorado are violative of due process.37 Another
writer,38 suggesting that the court begged the question, stated that
the question before the court was "whether the defendant Bowers
had sufficient contacts with the state so as to make substituted service of process on her permissible within the limits of due process.""
An analysis of the cases cited by the court clearly illustrates
that the "minimal contacts" discussed therein involved a thorough
consideration of the factual situation which gave rise to the state's
seeking to subject the objecting parties to in personam jurisdiction.
Many writers have already discussed these cases fully, 4' and this
writer could add little to that discussion. Nevertheless, the court's
37 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 85 (Colo.

1964). See textual discussion
pp. 217-18 supra and citations therein.
38 Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 309, 313 (1965).
39 Ibid.
40 See textual discussion supra pp. 217-18.
41 Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1963); Campbell, Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Individuals and Foreign Corporations:the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 36 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead -Long
Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 285 (1958) ; Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. CH.
L. REV. 569 (1958); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249 (1959) ; Wilson, In Personam
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV.
363 (1957); Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV.
909 (1960); Note, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1963) ; Note, 37 IND. L.J. 333 (1962) ;
Note, 44 IOWA L. REV. 361 (1959); Comment, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 86 (1964);

Comment, 38 WASH. L. REV. 560 (1963).
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reliance upon Hanson v. Denckla"2 to delimit the scope of the
"minimal contact" required does need further analysis.
Hanson involved a rather complex factual situation, but the
primary question before the Court was whether a Florida judgment
affecting the status of a Delaware trust company which had been
served with process by publication should be given full faith and
credit in Delaware. After carefully examining the transactions relating to the trust held by the Delaware trust company, the Court
found as a matter of fact that "The defendant trust company has
no office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None of the
trust assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the
record discloses no solicitation of business in that state either in
person or by mail."'3 Nowhere in the Clemens opinion, however,
can a factual discussion be found which would support the conclusion that the defendant had had no contact with Colorado. In fact,
the affidavit submitted by Clemens in the District Court would indicate that not only had Bowers been in Colorado but also that the
automobile was loaned in Colorado."
Perhaps the reason for the absence of a factual discussion of
defendant Bowers' contact with Colorado was the court's unstated
but implicit understanding of the principle in Colorado that negligence of a permittee will not be imputed to an owner of an automobile, at least when there is no indication of negligence on the
part of the owner either through physical presence in the automobile or in the irresponsible loaning of the automobile to the
permittee.45 But the question of liability was not before the court;
the issue to be resolved was Bowers' amenability to service of
process." Chief Judge Arraj, in a well considered Colorado Federal
District Court opinion, 7 discussed the ever expanding concepts of
in personam jurisdiction:
One of the most elementary of legal principles is that a basis
of jurisdiction must exist before a court has competence to act. Two
4

U.S. 235 (1958).
at 251. It should be noted that the court's factual finding is preceeded by the
quotation from Hanson found in and relied upon by the Colorado court in Clemens.
Additionally the citations relied upon by the Supreme Court as supporting its finding
of fact are the very same the Colorado court regarded as being limited by Hanson;
i.e., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; and Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
"See discussion supra note 20.
45 Graham v. Shilling, 133 Colo. 5, 9, 291 P.2d 396 (1955).
It is a general rule that negligence in the use of an automobile by one
other than the owner cannot be imputed to the owner merely because of his
ownership, an automobile not being in itself a dangerous instrumentality.
48 Clifford, supra note 38, at 315.
47 Elliott v. Cabeen, 224 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1963).
2Hanson v. Denckla, 357

43Id.
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tests are applied in determining whether a basis exists. The first is
the inquiry whether legislative jurisdiction exists- does the state
have power to declare that its courts have jurisdiction over a particular subject matter? The second is whether judicial jurisdiction
exists, a determination made on the basis of a twofold test: (1)
assuming that legislative jurisdiction exists, has the state exercised
it by providing the courts with a method for acquiring jurisdiction?
(2) If a method has been so provided, are there sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the requirements of the method provided ?"

The discussion of Bowers' position in the first holding is difficult to fit within the form prescribed by Chief Judge Arraj. It must
be assumed that the court accepted the well-established principle
that legislative jurisdiction over nonresident motorists is within the
power of the state. But the discussion of judicial jurisdiction is
more difficult, since the court in Clemens did not clearly differentiate the distinctions between the exercise of legislative jurisdiction
and the factual basis for subjecting one to that jurisdiction.
Although legislative intent would seem to controvert the idea
that owners not operating an automobile at the time of an accident
were excluded from the operation of the act,4" the court could have
supported its ultimate holding that defendant Bowers was not amenable to substituted service of process on this basis. The court, in its
initial interpretation of the original act,"t had said in Carlson v.
District Court,
So far as we are advised and can learn, it is universally held that
statutes, such as section 48(1), [Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92,
§ 4, p. 324], supra, providing for substituted service, are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed and followed
before jurisdiction of the person can attach thereunder .... 11

Later Judge Knous, speaking in federal district court and relying
upon the language in Carlson, held the act inapplicable to persons
not personally operating an automobile at the time of an accident."
On that occasion he stated:
Construing their statutes, courts in other jurisdictions generally
have held that the words 'while operating' and 'operation by' as is
the language of section 48(1), [Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, § 4,
p. 324], supra, apply only to nonresident individuals personally
operating a motor vehicle and do not include a non-resident owner

not then present in such state, even though the operation was with

53
his knowledge and consent.

He noted further:
Decisions in which service on a non-resident owner not person48

Id. at 52.

49 See discussion at note 17 supra.

Colo. Sess. Laws. 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25.
Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 342, i80 P.2d 525 (1947).
52 Larsen v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239 (D. Colo. 1953).
50
51

53 Id. at 240.
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ally operating the motor vehicle or present therein at the time of
accident has been upheld seem uniformly attributable to express statutory language so permitting."
Thus, it would have been entirely proper on the basis of existing precedent for the court to have declared the act inapplicable to
defendant Bowers. Such a declaration would have involved the
recognition that the legislature had not exercised legislative jurisdiction over nonresident owners not physically operating an automobile at the time of an accident. But the court made no such
declaration. Consequently, it must be assumed that the court accepted
the legislative exercise of jurisdiction over persons in the position
of defendant Bowers.
The acceptance by the court of the exercise of legislative jurisdiction over a nonresident owner whose permittee was involved in
an accident in Colorado required of the court a discussion of the
jurisdictional facts prerequisite to a final determination of the
existence of judicial jurisdiction. Although, as subsequent discussion
will show, it is the position of this writer that the factual conclusion
reached by the court with respect to this final test of judicial jurisdiction could have turned differently, it is unfortunate that the
court accepted the exercise of legislative jurisdiction. Since the
court was determined in limine to conclude that the requisite factual
grounds were not present to support judicial jurisdiction," the court
was adopting a construction of the act which would require a holding
of unconstitutionality. The court, discussing the scope of the statute,
stated:
The language in Chapter 75 providing for substituted service
of process is broad enough to warrant resort to such service on a
nonresident owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in
Colorado where the owner has no contacts or ties, minimal or otherwise, with Colorado -the
status of Barbara Bowers, defendant in
56
the trial court.

In this light the act is clearly unconstitutional. But to adopt a
construction of an act which renders it unconstitutional when, as
here, an alternative approach would have rendered it constitutional,
is to ignore the well recognized principle "that an act should be
upheld as constitutional if possible, and that if one construction
would violate both federal and state Constitutions and another
interpretation would be consonant therewith, the latter should be
adopted . .."" Furthermore, the holding of the act unconstitutional
117 F. Supp. at 241.
See discussion at note 21 supra.
56 390 P.2d at 85 ; see also the discussion at note 21 supra.
5
7Champlin Ref. Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 334, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
54

55
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on this basis was unnecessary to the ultimate decision by the court
that the notice provisions of the act were deficient.58
Nevertheless, the factual foundation existing in Clemens could

have supported a finding of judicial jurisdiction over defendant
Bowers.

The Restatement (Second)

of Conflicts of Laws states

when a state has judicial jurisdiction:
A state has judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has
done or caused to be done, an act which either took place in the
state or resulted in consequences in the state for the purposes of any
cause of action arising out of the act within limitations of reason9
ableness appropriate to the relationship derived from the act.

A comment which follows this section discusses its application to
nonresident motorist acts:
In this country, the rule of this Section is most frequently applied in the case of motor vehicles. Every state provides by statute
for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in certain circumstances over
a non-resident motorist as to actions growing out of an accident
or collision he may have had in the state. Such a statute may be
constitutionally applied if it is in effect when the vehicle is operated within the State, and if it makes provision for giving the nonresident motorists reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity
to be heard.
Where a non-resident owner of a motor vehicle does not himself
operate it within the state but causes another to operate it, there is
a question of interpretation of the statute as to whether it is applicable. If the statute is interpreted as subjecting the owner of the
vehicle to the jurisdiction of the court in such a case, the court
acquires jurisdiction over him even though he was not himself at
any time within the state.60
Under this well-recognized rule6I defendant Bowers would be sub-

ject to the substituted service of process provisions of the act.
Apparently the only case to extensively discuss the rationale
6
of the Restatement rule is Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. "
58 See the discussion by Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm"
L. REV. 309, 310 (1965), wherein it is observed:

Jurisdiction, 37 U. COLO.

Indeed, unless the court chose to discuss this issue in order to provide
guidelines for future legislation -a meritorious, if unusual, motive for a
court to decide constitutional questions - its decision would seem a clear
departure from the traditional refusal of courts to decide constitutional
questions unless indispensible to decision.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, p. 89 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956).

6OId.comment f at 94.
61See generally authorities cited supra note 41 and the Reporters Note, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, at 96-98 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).

62 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961). This case has been extensively noted. See e.g., Note
7 VILL. L. BEV- 554 (1962); Comment, Motor Vehicle Area Provides Impetus for
Further Expansion of In Personam Jurisdiction, 23 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1963); Comment, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 446 (1962); 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 747 (1962); 37
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 554 (1962) ; 48 VA. L. REV. 378 (1962) ; 13 W. RES. L. REV.
396 (1962).
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In Davis, Judge Sobeloff correctly anticipated the method of analysis
suggested by Chief Judge Arraj in Elliot v. Cabbeen.63 Consequently,
the decision specifically held (1) that the North Carolina legislature had exercised legislative jurisdiction over a nonresident owner
of an automobile driven by a sub-permittee at the time of an accident " and (2) that the requisite jurisdictional facts were present
so that it was constitutional to apply the act to such an owner.
Although the amicus brief in Clemens fully discussed Davis,
no mention of that case appears in the court's opinion. It would
not have been difficult for the court to have distinguished the
North Carolina act from that of Colorado's, " but the failure to do
so is not significant since the Clemens decision had already assumed
the exercise of legislative jurisdiction. The failure to discuss Davis
becomes more substantial, however, when it becomes apparent that
once legislative jurisdiction had been deemed exercised, the two
courts had before them the identical question for resolution; namely
whether the jurisdictional facts were present.
Judge Sobeloff in Davis began his consideration of this problem by discussing the same cases which were cited by the court in
Clemens to support its ruling of unconstitutionality. First, he interpreted International Shoe Co. v. Washington"" as establishing the
requirement that the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
A method of analysis was deemed conclusive of this requirement:
Therefore, what is required is an analysis and weighing of the
63224 F. Supp. 50 (D.

Colo. 1963).

69 The owner in Davis, unlike the owner in Clemens, had never been in the state, and

further, the owner in Davis was deemed subject to substituted service of process
when the act done consisted of furnishing her son an automobile with permission to
loan it to others. The automobile was being driven by a third person at the time of
the accident.
6 The North Carolina Statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1963) provides:
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privilege conferred
by the laws now or hereafter in force in this state permitting the operation
of motor vehicles, as evidenced by the operation of a motor vehicle by such
nonresident on the public highways of this state, or at any other place in
this state, other than as so permitted or regulated, shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney and the
attorney of his executor or administrator, upon whom may be served all
summonses or other lawful process in any action or proceeding against him
or his executor or administrator, growing out of any accident or collision
in which said nonresident may be involved by reason of the operation by
him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or implied, of a
motor vehicle on such public highways of this state, or at any other place in
this state, and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his
agreement that any such process against him or his executor or administrator
shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally,
or on his executor or administrator. (Emphasis added.)
6s326 U.S. 310 (1945).
67 294 F.2d at 646.
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interests of a defendant in not being called upon to defend in the
forum, of a plaintiff in being able to acquire jurisdiction over a
defendant in the place where the cause of action arose, and of a state
in being able to open its courts to the particular lawsuit. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, Comment C
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Developments in the Law-State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 924-925 (1960).68

Balancing the respective interests of the plaintiff and the defendant,
Judge Sobeloff relied upon McGee v. International Life Ins. Co."
as establishing sound precedent for subjecting the nonresident to
suit in the forum where the cause of action arose, where the witnesses reside, and, if possible, in the state whose law is applicable.
In Davis, these conveniences could be provided the plaintiff without
corresponding disadvantages to the defendant."
The strongest argument by the court in Davis, however, was
with respect to the interest of the state in acquiring jurisdiction over
the nonresident owner. Hanson v. Denckla 1 was regarded as merely
requiring "that the forum state have some interest in being able to
open its courts to the action. Unquestionably a state in which an
automobile tort was committed has such an interest." 2 This interest
was described succinctly and in the language of the Restatement:
The state has a strong interest in being able to provide a convenient forum where its citizens may be able to seek, from the
owner as well as from the actual operator, compensation for injuries that will often be extremely serious. Jurisdiction over the

driver who inflicted the injury does not exhaust the state's interest; it is not pushing the matter too far to recognize that the state
may also assert the jurisdiction of its courts over the owner who
placed the vehicle in the driver's hands to take it onto the state's
highways. (Citation omitted.)
In Hess v. Pawloski . . .jurisdiction was asserted over a non-

resident motorist who was also the owner of an automobile. We are
asked to go beyond that case and uphold North Carolina's jurisdiction over an automobile owner who had never come into the state.
However, the momentary physical presence of the defendant within
the state should not be controlling. Far more important are the
consequences foreseeable from his authorizing the use of his auto73
mobile there.
The language of Judge Sobeloff on this occasion is not unlike
6Id.

at 647.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, Comment at

91-93 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 924-925 '(1960).
69355 U.S. 220 (1957).
70 294 F.2d at 647.

71357 U.S. 235 (1957). See textual discussion at pp. 222-23 supra for criticism of
the Clemens application of Hanson.
72 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961).

73 Ibid.
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that used by the Supreme Court on other occasions. In Young v.
Masci,7 decided in 1932, it was said with respect to liability:
A person who sets in motion in one State the means by which
injury is inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process
clause, be made liable for that injury whether the means employed
be a responsible agent or an irresponsible instrument.15
No good reason is suggested why, where there is permission to
take the automobile into a state for use upon its highways, personal
liability should not be imposed upon the owner in case of injury
inflicted there by the driver's negligence, regardless of the fact that
the owner6 is a citizen and resident of another State. (Citation
omitted.)7
Additionally, in McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., 77 the Supreme
Court discussed the entry of judgment against a nonresident corporation not doing business in the state:
Turning to this case we think it apparent that the Due Process
Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State. (Citation omitted.) The contract was
delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and
the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they
were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in
order to hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost
of bringing an action in a foreign forum - thus in effect making
the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses - as here
on the company's defense of suicide - will be found in the insured's
locality. Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it
is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract
but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.
(Citations omitted.) There is no contention that respondent did
74Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). In Young, suit was brought against a resident of New Jersey who had loaned his car to a third person in New Jersey. The
third person drove the car in New York and was involved in an accident with the
plaintiff. New York had a statute which provided:
Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a public
highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle
or motor cycle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
legally using or operating the same with permission, express or implied, of
said owner. N. Y. Laws 1929, vol. 1, p. 82, cited in Young v. Masci,
supra at 255-56.
The Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute as applied to Young. The
fact that Young would not have been liable in New Jersey was not deemed to deny
him due process.

751d. at 258.
76 289 U.S. at 260.

77 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220

(1957).
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not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare
its defenses and appear.7 8

In both Young and McGee the Supreme Court was discussing
liability and presumably the factual basis upon which liability was
imposed would be more stringently scrutinized than if mere amenability to substituted service of process was being considered. 9 In
Clemens the facts were that defendant Bowers had been in Colorado immediately preceding the accident. She had departed from
the state leaving in the possession of defendant Clemens her automobile. Evidently Bowers imposed no restrictions on Clemens' use
of the car. Clemens drove the car and through its operation injuries
were inflicted upon others." Is it not possible, then, to conclude
that the factual basis existed for subjecting defendant Bowers to in
personam jurisdiction?
II.

THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT

The second holding in Clemens- that, "Procedures only fifty
percent effective cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring
notice to the defendant or to constitute due process.'81 - is perhaps
the better reasoned portion of the Clemens opinion. Nevertheless,
a discussion of this portion of the opinion is not less difficult than
the discussion of the "minimal contact" portion. Several objections to the final decision reached by the court are proper.
The first objection is one which is common to most decisions
involving a consideration of nonresident motorist legislation; that
78 Id. at 223-24. The Colorado Supreme Court considered this case as being limited
by Hanson. See textual discussion supra pp. 222-23. But the Court in Hanson
specifically distinguished McGee:
The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done
or transaction consummated in the forum state. In that respect, it differs
from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 and the cases
therein cited. 357 U.S. at 251.
7 See discussion p. 223 supra. In the Brief of Amicus Curiae, Clemens v. District Court,
390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964), Tanksly v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1960), is
relied upon to support the proposition that jurisdictional questions should be considered independently of the question of liability.
Determination of questions of possible ultimate liability to respond in
damages is not now necessary. The statute here involved does not purport
to deal with the question of ultimate liability. Its purpose is to subject to
the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts nonresidents concerned in the operation of automobiles within the State within the terms of the statute, so that
its citizens may assent as against such persons their claims in local courts
so that thereby the question of actual liability may be determined ...
Upon consideration of a motion to quash service of summons in such an
instance the question is whether the allegations of the complaint and the
facts of the case as disclosed show that the defendant brought before the
Court is such a defendant as is subjected by the statute to substituted service
of process. If so, questions of actual liability are required to be dctermined
by other and further proceedings. (Emphasis in original.) Tanksly v.
Dodge, supra at 927-28.
80 See note 21 supra.
81 390 P.2d at 90. See also textual discussion at pp. 220-22 supra.
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is, courts tend to rely upon decisions interpreting statutes different
from their own. All fifty states presently have some form of legislation designed to secure jurisdiction over nonresident motorists,8
and in virtually every state the legislation is significantly different
in some detail. These differences in legislation have resulted, as
could be expected, in different constructions by courts even when
essentially identical questions were under consideration. Nowhere
8

Statutes: only the first section is cited unless changed subsequent to latest compilation.
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199 (Supp. 1963).
ALASKA REV. STAT. tit. 9, § 09.05.020 (Supp. 1964).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-502 (1956).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-342.1 (Supp. 1963).
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17450 (1960).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-1 (1963), declared unconstitutional in Clemens
v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52 (Supp. 1964).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3112 (Supp. 1962).
D. C. CODE § 40-423 (1961).
FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (Supp. 1964).
GA. CODE ANN. § 68-801 (1957); § 68-802 (Supp. 1963).
REV. LAWS OF HAWAII § 230-33 (Supp. 1963).
IDAHO CODE § 49-1602 (1957).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 9-301 (1963 Bar Edition).
IND. STATE ANN. § 47-1043 (Supp. 1964).
IOWA CODE § 321.498 (Supp. 1964).
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-401 (Supp. 1961). § 8-402 Sess. Laws of
Kan. ch. 55 (1963).
KY. REV. STAT. § 188.010'(1960).
LA. REV. STAT. § 13-3474 (Supp. 1963).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 70 (Supp. 1963).
(Supp. 1964).
MD. CODE ANN. art. 6612, § 115 (1957) ; art. 661/2, § 115 (2)
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3A (1958).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (1960).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.55 (1960).
MIss. CODE ANN. § 9352-61 (Supp. 1962).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.210 (Supp. 1964).
MONT. REV. CODE § 53-202 '(1961); § 53-204 superseded by Rule 40 (b)
(1964).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14.070 (Supp. 1963).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.070 (Supp. 1963).
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264.1 (1955).
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2.1 (1961) ; § 39:7-2.1 (Supp. 1964).
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-3,4 (1960).
NEW YORK MCKINNEY VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 253 (Supp. 1964).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1963).
N. D. CEN. CODE ANN. § 39-01-11 (1960).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (Supp. 1964).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 391 (1962).
ORE. REV.STAT. § 15.190 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 2001 (1960).
R. 1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-7-6 (Supp. 1964).
S. C. CODE § 46-104 (1962).
S. D. CODE § 33.0809 (Supp. 1960).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-224 et seq. (Supp. 1964).
TEX. CIVIL STAT. § 2039a (Vernon's 1964).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-8 '(1960).
VT. STAT. tit.
12 § 891 (1958).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (1957).
REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 46.64.040 (1962).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5555 (1) (1961).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 345.09 (Supp. 1965).
WYo. STAT ANN. § 1-52 (Supp. 1963).
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is this fact more evident than in two cases cited by the court in
Clemens-Grote v. Rogers" and Kurrilla v. Roth.84
In Grote the Maryland Court of Appeals was asked to invalidate
a statute which conclusively presumed an address which had been
given by a defendant at the time of an accident, or which appeared
of record in the files of the department of vehicle registration in
his state of residence, to be the defendant's address in fact at the
time of substituted service by registered mail.' This conclusive
presumption was one basis for the court's rejection of the statute,
as is apparent from the following excerpt from the Grote opinion:
The direction as to notice in the Maryland act is that it shall be
sent to the defendant at his address as specified in the process. The
address so specified is not required to be the true address of the
defendant at that time, or even his last known address, but it is to be
conclusively regarded as correct for the purposes of the suit if it
is an address which the defendant gave in any proceeding before
any court, magistrate, or justice of the peace, or to any police officer
or deputy or other person at the time of accident or at a subsequent
period, or if it is his latest address appearing on the records of the
commissioner of motor vehicles or other offices charged with the
administration of the motor vehicle laws of the state in which any
such vehicle is registered in the defendant's name. (Emphasis supplied.) M

This portion of the court's opinion immediately precedes that portion
of the opinion which was quoted at length by the court in Clemens.
It continues:
The sources of information to which the plaintiff is thus
referred by the statute may not appraise him of the defendant's
correct address at the time when the notice is to be mailed. In the
period, which may be prolonged, between the accident and the
institution of the suit, a legitimate change of the prospective
defendant's domicile may render his earlier declarations as to his
87
residence obsolete.

Thus, it is apparent that the conclusion reached in Grote was
founded upon a statutory defect which did not exist in Clemens.
Furthermore, it may have been that the court in Giote would have
reached a different conclusion had the statute provided that notice
be sent to the defendant's "last known address" as did the Colorado
act.88
8Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md.685, 149 At. 547 (1930).
84
Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944).
5MD.
AcTs ch. 254 (1929), quoted not 12 supra.
88 Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 at 551 (1930).
87Ibid. Also cited in Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 89 (Colo. 1964).
88 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963)

supra note 4.
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It is also apparent from the entire Grote opinion, that the court
considered the actual receipt of notice by the defendant necessary
to comport with the requirements of due process.89 That the Colorado court read the Grote opinion in this manner, also, is supported
9 ° immediately following the Grote
by the quote from Kurrilla
citation.9'
In Kurrilla, the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to determine whether substituted service of process upon a soldier on active
duty, served by leaving a copy of summons and complaint at the
home of the soldier's mother and stepfather, was within the statutory provisions for such service at a person's "usual place of abode. "92
After construing " 'usual place of abode,' [as] the place where one
is 'actually living' at the time when service is made," 3 the court
deemed the return of service to be false, and ruled that the service
must be set aside."
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Court considered the
due process requirements of notice.
The general rule in regard to the service of process, established
by centuries of precedent, is that process must be served personally,
within the jurisdiction of the court, upon the person to be affected
thereby. Substituted or constructive service, when provided by
statute, is in derogation of the general rule, and so the statutory
directions must be strictly construed and fully carried out to confer
The construction and applijurisdiction. (Citations omitted.)
cation of R.S. 2:27-59, N.J.S.A., supra, must comport with the
fundamentals of due process. The design of provisions for such
substituted service is to afford the defendant actual notice of the
action in time to make defense, if he so chooses, and thus to serve
the essential purpose of personal service. The principle of reasonable notice is of the essence. The object of all process is to impart
to the person affected notice of the proceeding and an opportunity
to defend; and the sufficiency of the statutory substitute for personal service depends upon whether it is reasonably calculated to
provide the defendant with notice of the action or proceeding and
95
an opportunity to be heard. (Citations omitted.)
a9 See discussion by Clifford supra note 38, at 326-27.
90 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944).
91 390 P.2d at 90.
2N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-59 (1937).
Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 864 (1944).

93

at 865.
5 Id. at 865.
" Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). In Blackmer, the designation by
Congress of consuls to serve subpoenas upon citizens of the United States was found
not to violate due process. In dictum the court states "The efficacy of an attempt
to provide constructive service in this country would rest upon the presumption that
the notice would be given in a manner calculated to reach the witness abroad."
Blackmer v. United States, supra at 439.

94Id.
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To support its statement of the law relating to notice, the court

relied upon three decisions by the Supreme Court: Blackman v.
United States,9" Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v.
1
Superior Court,"
and McDonald v. McBee. Of these decisions, only
McDonald appears relevant to the discussion, and the criterion laid

down by Justice Holmes there has since been superseded by Wuchter.9 The most serious objection to the use of Kurrilla to support
the reasoning in Clemens, however, is that the conclusion reached

therein is inimical to the ultimate holding of unconstitutionality in
Clemens. Although the discussion of the requirement of notice in
Kurrilla was not necessary to support the decision to set aside service

of process -

service being valid only at one's actual place of

°°

nevertheless, the same reasoning applied to the Coloabode" -,
rado Act' would have led to a holding of constitutionality. The
New Jersey statute was deemed constitutional and not at variance
Washington ex rel Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1933). The court determined that a state statute providing for substituted service
on a corporation which had previously done business in the state and which had
since removed without leaving an agent upon whom service could be served, was
not in violation of due process even though no provision for securing notice to the
corporation was provided in the statute. The Court stated:
The power of the State altogether to exclude the corporation, and the
consequent ability to condition its entrance into the State, distinguishes this
case from those involving substituted service upon individuals . . . whose
entrance into a State may render them amenable to action there, only if the
statute providing for substituted service incorporates reasonable provision
for giving the defendant notice of the initiation of litigation, Hess v. Pawlaski, 274 U.S. 352. Washington ex rel Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v.
Superior Court, supra at 365-66.
At no point, however, did the Court deem actual notice a prerequisite to valid
substituted service of process.
98
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). Justice Holmes declared invalid a judgement on a personal note where service on the defendant was effected by publication subsequent to the time when the defendant had removed from Texas and established domicile in Missouri.
9 Although some of the language in both Hess and Wuchter could be construed to
support a conclusion that actual notice is required, modern authorities simply do not
support such a conclusion. Reading the cases in context, the most that can be divined
is that a statute ". . . must, in order to be valid, contain a provision making it
reasonably probab!e that notice . . . will be communicated to the nonresident defendant who is sued.'' Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18 (1928).
The generally accepted modern statement of the standard to be applied to notice
is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75, Comment e, p. 94
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956):
It is not necessary that the defendant should have received actual knowledge of the action in which the judgment was rendered. It is sufficient that
the steps taken to give him notice of the action and an opportunity to be
heard satisfy the requirements of the rule of this Section.
For jurisdictions not following the RESTATEMENT rule see Gibbons, A Survey oj
the Modern Nonresident Motorists Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 257, 267 (1960) and
jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements- A Plea
for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151, 178 (1963).
100 See textual discussion, pp. 232-33 supra.
97

"I

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963), supra note 4.
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with the requirement of actual notice, because service would be valid
only if served at one's actual place of abode. Similarly, since the
Colorado Act provided for service of process sent by registered
mail to one's "last known address,""1 2 this address, under the Ku'rilla
rationale, would be one's actual address; and notice would be actual
notice.
Disregarding the inapplicability or imprecise application of
the Grote and Kurrilla cases by the court, however, the question of
whether or not the provisions for notice contained in the Colorado
Nonresident Motorist Act meet the requirement of due process
still remains. The Act, in pertinent part, provides:
...the court shall . . . enter an order ex parte setting forth the
last known address of the defendant and authoribing service to be
made on the secretary of state. Service shall be made by delivering

two copies of the process, complaint, motion and order of court
to the secretary of state, his deputy or assistant ....
Notice of such
service and a copy of each instrument so served shall forthwith be
sent by the secretary of state by certified or registered mail,
addressed to the defendant at his address given in the order of
court, with return receipt requested. Promptly after such mailing
the secretary of state shall file with the clerk of the court a certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete thirty days
after service of process on the secretary of stale as provided in
this section. (Emphasis supplied.) 103

It is clear from the portion just quoted that the act must be classified with those from other states which provide that notice be sent
to the defendant's "last known address." It is clear froma the
Clemens opinion that the court did not consider this aspect of the
Colorado Act. The court did consider, however, that the service
provisions did not provide for filing the return receipt, and that
service on the secretary of state was deemed complete regardless of
whether or not the receipt was returned or whether or not notice
had been imparted." 4
Although the court throughout the second portion of the
opinion professed belief in the principle that the notice required

need not be actual,'

the conclusion reached was that anything

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 390 P.2d at 90.

Though Chapter 75 requires that the papers be sent by certified or
registered mail, "with return receipt requested," it makes no provision as to
the disposition to be made by the secretary of state of the "return receipt."
The statute provides that the secretary of state shall "promptly" after such
mailing certify as to the fact of mailing. It necessarily follows that if the
secretary of state "promptly" makes his certificate of service, he will have
done so before he could receive any "return receipt" as requested.
105 Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm Jurisdiction," 37 U. CoLo. L. Rrv. 309 (1965).
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short of actual notice would be deficient. " Having reached this
conclusion, it is unfortunate that the court failed to consider the
implications of the last "known address" aspect of the act. As noted
in the discussion of Kurrilla,I°" which is typical of cases construing
"last known address" acts, the orthodox approach would be to
require that the address to which notice was sent to be the actual
address in fact. 8 Applying this rationale it would be possible to
uphold the constitutionality of the act while refusing to allow
service on a particular defendant who did not receive actual notice
of the suit.
While notice of suit actually acquired, but without the terms
of a statute providing for substituted service, cannot give validity
to a statute which is constitutionally deficient,"8 it should be noted
that Clemens had actually obtained notice of the suit and promptly
moved to "quash" service. At least one case,"' involving a statute
not unlike that in Clemens," considered the filing of such a motion
as evidence that service of process had been in fact received. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated therein:
A letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed is presumed to
have reached the addressee, although this presumption is not conclusive, but is founded upon the probability that the Postal Department will properly discharge its duties. . . . This presumption is
strengthened where the letter was registered, indeed, it is not
contended here that there was no actual delivery. Defendants rest
their case alone upon the fact that this return receipt has not been
filed, a requirement, as we have seen, not written into our statute.
Not only does it contain reasonable provisions for probable communications, but the conduct of the parties indicates communication
106 See textual discussion, pp. 232-33 supra. The court stated at page 90:

We are not unmindful of the fact that courts of last resort of many
states have held that procedures such as those had here and statutes bearing
marked similarity to Chapter 75 are valid and not lacking in due process.
Our reasoning and analysis of the problems presented lead us to contrary
conclusions.

Here, proceeding under the statute, service was had on two defendants;
one received notice, the other did not. Though the effectiveness of procedures prescribed should not be finally adjudged on results attained in an
isolated case, the result here attained does cast grave doubt on the effectiveness of the methods provided and pursued.
107 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1964), and textual discussion
pp. 234-35 supra.
108 Gibbons, A Survey o1 the Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv.
257, 266-69 (1960).
109 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928).
110 Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S.E. 644 (1939).
111 CODE OF VIRGINIA § 8-67.2 (1957).

...[sluch service shall be sufficient upon the said nonresident, pro-

vided, that notice of such service and a copy of the process or notice are
forthwith sent by registered mail, with registered delivery receipt requested....
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was actually had. Counsel promptly appeared, and while their
special appearance did not waive the claim that this return receipt
should have been filed, it did indicate reasonable probability that
process had been received, not through random chance, as was true
in Wuchter v. Pizzutti ...but because there had been compliance
with an adequate statute."2

While it is true that Clemens did not receive the registered
letter addressed to him -the
court stated, "The record does not
shed any light on what may have become of the letter directed to
Clemens." '13 - the reasoning in the Virginia decision with respect
to the filing of a return receipt appears valid." ' Furthermore, it
would not seem unjust to place upon a prospective defendant the
burden of making his latest address available to one who may have
a valid claim to assert."' Certainly, a liberal construction based

upon the statutory provision for extensions and continuence" . could
afford adequate safeguards for one who had, as did Clemens, notice
of the suit.
Earlier some attempt was made to determine legislative intent

with regard to those persons over whom the legislature had sought
to exercise jurisdiction."' The same question now arises with regard
to the changes which the 1961 Act made in the provisions relating
to service of process.118 There would seem to be no doubt that the
intent was to broaden the scope of the act." 9 Nevertheless, investigation by this writer has failed to disclose the purpose behind the
112 Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S.E. 644, 647 (1939).

113 390 P.2d at 90.
14In Speer v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960), the court
stated:
Securing a return receipt and filing it with the court clerk is not a prerequisite [to due process) ; it is only one of the possible provisions which
may be adopted. No case making it a prerequisite has been cited or found.
189 F. Supp. 434.
For further discussion see Comment, 42 DEN.L.C.J. 156-60 (1965).
115 See generally, Jox, Non-Resident Motorist Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements - A Plea for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963).
"1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-5 (1963).
117 See discussion note 17 supra.
118 Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, § 3, at 324.
Service of such process shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
. . .with the secretary of state, or in his office, and such service shall be
sufficient service upon such nonresident defendant ... provided, that notice
of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered
mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt
or, in the event the defendant refuses to accept such registered mail, the
registered mail with his refusal thereon and the plaintiff's affidavit of
compliance herewith are filed with the papers in the case on or before the
return day of the process, or within such further time as the court may
allow ....
119See generally, Clifford, supra note 105 at 323-26.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

changes effected."' It would not seem to be illogical, in view of
the similarity between the Virginia Act 2 ' and the 1961 Act, to conclude that a similar design was desired by the 1961 General Assembly; this design would be particularly true in view of the interpretation placed upon the Virginia Act.
Stephen G. Heady

INSURANCE -

OMNIBUS CLAUSE -

PERMISSIVE USE IS THE

PROPER TEST OF COVERAGE UNDER PUBLIC AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE

POLICIES

AND MINOR

DEVIATION RULE APPLIED IN

DETERMINING WHETHER A DEVIATION FROM THE PERMITTED USE
PRECLUDES COVERAGE UNDER

THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE.

American Bus Lines, Inc. v. American Surety Co. 238 F. Supp. 589
(D. Colo. 1965).
A State Highway Department employee was directed to take
a truck from Berthoud Pass to Denver for the purpose of having
the truck's radio repaired and then to return to Berthoud Pass. Upon
arriving in Denver, the employee first visited his parent's home and
then reported to the highway shops. The radio work was completed
shortly before noon, but instead of returning to his work station in
Berthoud Pass, he visited a friend's home where he drank a few
bottles of beer.
About four o'clock p.m. he left his friend's home and started
on his return trip to Berthoud Pass. While traveling the very highway which would have returned him to his work station, his truck
collided with a bus owned by the American Bus Lines, Inc. The
state employee was killed and the administrator of his estate brought
this action for a declaratory judgment as to the coverage under a
120

121
122

It is known that the legislation was proposed by the Colorado Bar Association but
since no legislative history is available in Colorado, it is impossible to go further.
See Menard, Legislation and the Colorado Supreme Court- Techniques of Statutory
Construction, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 425, 433-35 (1954).
See textual discussion, pp. 236-37 supra.
390 P.2d at 91.

' Schultz v. Krosch, 204 Minn. 585, 284 N.W. 782 (1939): In defining the purpose
of the "omnibus clause," the court held, "the effect of the omnibus clause was to
extend the insurance coverage to any person while using the automobile with the
consent of the named insured." See generally 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
P .CTIcE, §§ 4366-4368 (1962); 12 COUCH, INSURANCE, §§ 45: 463-45-468 (2d
ed. 1964); Austin, Permissive Use Under The Omnibus Clause of The Automobile
Liability Policy, 29 INS. COUNSEL J. 49 (1962); Dimond, The New Standard Automobile Policy, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 67 (1956) ; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 604 (1949).
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liability policy containing an omnibus clause' issued by the defendant
to the State.
The Colorado Federal District Court, Doyle, J., held that the
proper test of liability coverage for an employee is "permissive use"
rather than "scope of employment" and that the employee's use of
the highway department vehicle, at the time of the accident, was with
the state's permission and hence he was covered by the policy.'
The defendant argued that "scope of employment" 3 should be
the proper test of liability coverage rather than "permissive use" 4
because the statute5 authorizing the purchase of the insurance allowed the state purchasing agent to obtain insurance for the purpose
of insuring officers, employees, and agents against liability "for injuries or damages resulting from their negligence or other tortious
conduct during the course of their service of employment."
The court listed the following reasons for rejecting this contention: (1) the statute is an authorization statute and was not
designed to limit the scope of coverage; (2) the defense of ultra vires
belongs to the State of Colorado and not to the defendant insurance
company; (3) the insurance company is estopped from denying
coverage because the contract was presumably written by it with
full knowledge of the law, a consensual act on its part; and (4)
the Colorado Safety Responsibility Act 6 requires that a permission
clause be included in all liability policies.
Although the first three reasons offered by the court are not
2

American Bus Lines, Inc. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 238 F. Supp. 589
(D. Colo. 1965).
3 Gray v. Sawatzki, 291 Mich, 491, 289 N.W. 227 (1939): In this master and servant
case, the court held that when the employee is outside the scope of employment, he
is outside the employer's consent.
4Messer v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 19, 241 S.W.2d 856 (1951):
The court in this case employed the "permissive use" test and held that coverage
would be allowed where the use of the vehicle, at the time of the accident, was with
the permission of the named insured.
5
COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-16-2 (1963) provides:
The head of a department of the State of Colorado, with the approval of
the governor, or in the case of the county or city and county, the chief
executive officer or county commissioner, and subject to appropriations
being available therefor, is hereby authorized to procure insurance, through
the state purchasing agent as provided in chapter 3, article 4, C.R.S. 1963,
for the purpose of insuring its officers, employees, and agents against any
liability, other than a liability which may be insured against under the provisions of "The workmen's compensation act of Colorado," for injuries
or damages resulting from their negligence or other tortious conduct during
the course of their service or employment. Counties or cities and counties
are hereby authorized to insure their officers, employees, and agents against
similar liabilities.
6 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-7-22 (c) (1963) provides:
Said policy shall insure the person named therein and any other person
using or responsible for the use of said motor vehicle or motor vehicles with
the express or implied permission of said insured.
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without support,' the most persuasive is the fourth. It is generally
recognized that the purpose of such a statute is to guard against the
defense that the insured was not operating the vehicle personally or
through an agent, although it was being operated by another with
his express or implied consent.8 Such statutes have received liberal
constructions.'
In the present case the employee was given initial permission
to use the insured state vehicle. To obtain coverage under the "omnibus clause," the deceased employee's administrator had to show
that the employee's use of the vehicle, at the time of the accident,
was with the permission of the State of Colorado. The defendant
insurance company contended that this requirement could not be
satisfied because the employee had placed himself outside of the
1scope of permission" - the permission granted to the employee
did not include the right to make personal trips nor the right to use
intoxicants and, furthermore, the State Highway Department Regulations prohibited the use of state vehicles for pleasure and the use
of intoxicants while driving a state vehicle.
In resolving the question presented by this case - whether a
deviation in time, purpose, or geographical limits from the permitted
use precludes coverage under the "omnibus clause" - the courts
have adopted three different rules."0 Some courts have used the
"Liberal Rule"" which holds that once permission is given, it will
extend to any and all uses of the car, regardless of how grossly
statute cited note 5 supra as supporting the court's first reason. COLO. REV.
provides support for the court's second reason:
'(1) (a) No act of a corporation . . .shall be invalid by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act . . ., but
such lack of capacity or power may be asserted: ... (d) In a proceeding by
the attorney general as provided in this code, to dissolve the corporation, or
in a proceeding by the attorney general to enjoin the corporation from the
transaction of unauthorized business.
Davis v. National Cas. Co., 115 Minn. 125, 131 N.W. 1013 (1911) and Knott v.
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 161 Mo. App. 579, 144 S.W. 178 (1912) provide support for the court's third reason.
8 Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Halifax Fire Ins. Co., 281 N.Y.S. 193, 245 App. Div. 279,
affd, 272 N.Y. 457, 3 N.E.2d 867 (1936) ; Sears v. Maryland Cas. Co., 220 N.C. 9,
16 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
9
Chatfield v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 230 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1956).
10 Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356, 357 (1939): In discussing the three rules, the court stated:
There are three lines of authorities on this question under the usual omnibus
clause, (1) those holding any deviation, no matter how slight, will defeat
liability; (2) those holding that once permission is given, it will extend to
any and all uses of the car; and (3) those holding that slight deviation does
not violate the omnibus clause.
"Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Collins, 96 F.2d 83 (Sth Cir. 1938) ; Karton v. New
Amsterdam Gas. Co., 280 Ill. App. 201 (1935); Thomas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 121
So. 2d 593 (La. App. 1960); Foley v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 206,
245 S.W.2d 202 (1951); Maurer v. Fesing, 233 Wis. 565, 290 N.W. 191 (1940).
7See

STAT. § 31-2-5 (1963)
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the terms of the original permission may have been violated. Others
have adhered to the "Conversion Rule," sometimes called the "Strict
Rule,"'" which holds the use to be nonpermissive where it exceeds
the "scope of permission" given to such an extent as would render
a bailee liable in an action for conversion. A third group has adopted
the "Minor Deviation Rule.""3 Under this rule, if the use is not a
gross violation of the permitted use, even though it may have
amounted to a deviation, the permitee is still afforded coverage.
In the present case, the employee's personal trips constituted
deviations in time, purpose, and geographical limits from the permitted use. Since it is the use at the time of the accident that governs
coverage under the "omnibus clause,"' 4 the deviations in purpose
and geographical limits are insignificant because the employee was
returning to his work station on a direct route at the time of the
accident.
The court held that the employee's use of intoxicants did not
void permission nor the coverage because such a use would not
place an employee outside the "scope of employment,"'" a fortiori,
it would not place him beyond permission. There is also some direct
authority that drinking on the job in violation of an employer's
rule does not terminate permission.'
The last deviation to be considered, the time deviation, presented
the most difficult problem in this case. At the time of the accident
there was approximately a four hour time deviation. The court,
while not expressly adopting any of the three rules previously mentioned, held that this deviation did not operate to remove the employee from the "scope of permission."
Before determining what rule the court, by implication, adopted
in the present case, attention should be directed to the fact that
12Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Rivet, 89 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Hodges v. Ocean Acc.

& Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28 (1941); Hinchey v. National Sur.
Co., 99 N.H. 373, 111 A.2d 827 (1955); Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Lahman, 169 Okla. 380, 36 P.2d 274 (1934); Foote v. Grant, 56 Wash. 2d 630,
354 P.2d 893 (1960).
13Maryland Cas. Co. v. Williams, 184 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1950); Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 At. 866 (1924); Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn.
437, 232 N.W. 790 '(1930) ; Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 30 N.J. 262, 152 A.2d 589 (1959); Matits v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 59 N.J. Super. 373, 157 A.2d 853 (1960) ; Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh,
184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356 (1939).
14Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1955); Johnson v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 Atl. 496 (1932) ; Johnston v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 200 N.C. 763, 158 S.E. 473 (1931); Messer v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 193 Tenn. 19, 241 S.W.2d 856 (1951); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Peach,
193 Va. 260, 68 S.E.2d 520 (1952).
15 Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1964).
16New York Cas. Co. v. Lewellen, 184 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1950); cf. Zurich Gen.
Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 449 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1931).
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these attempts at classification are of necessity inexact and can be
used only as a guide to the question involved." The three rules
frequently overlap and it cannot always be determined into which
category the decisions of a given jurisdiction fall.' 8
It seems dear that the "Liberal Rule" was not adopted by the
court in this case. Although under that rule the result would have
been the same, no mention of the rule was made by the court and
considerable attention was devoted to the character of the use of
the vehicle after the court took notice of the fact that initial permission had been given.
Under a stringent application of the "Conversion Rule," it
seems that the court could have denied the plaintiff recovery.' The
decision in favor of coverage and the noticeable omission of any
discussion of the rule leaves the impression that it was not adopted
by the court.
The last rule to be considered, the "Minor Deviation Rule,"
appears to be the rule that the court adopted. While the court did
not mention the "Liberal" or the "Conversion" rule, it did discuss
the "Minor Deviation Rule" in somewhat favorable terms and the
result in this case is in accord with that rule - there was a deviation
from the permitted use; the deviation was found to be insignificant;
and the permittee was held to be within the "scope of permission."
17 Gulla v. Reynolds, 82 Ohio App. 243, 81 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1948): "The judicial
struggling to formulate a rule may be accounted for by reason of this being a factual
question and the cases show an infinite variety of circumstances.18 See Harper v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 111 N.W.2d 480
(1961).
19 See Bekaert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1956): Ten
and one-half hour time deviation barred recovery. Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales
Corp., 11 Cal. 2d 64, 77 P.2d 1059 (1938): Permitee granted permission to use car
for two hours; accident occurred twenty-three hours later. The court held that the
use was nonpermissive. Di Rebaylio v. Herndon, 6 Cal. App. 2d 567, 44 P.2d 581
(1935): Time deviation of approximately twenty-four hours held to preclude coverage. Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28 (1941):
Employee permitted to drive to and from work but instructed not to drive at night
or on Sundays. The accident occurred one Sunday afternoon. It was held not covered.
Ranthum v. Ferguson, 202 Minn. 209, 277 N.W. 547 (1938): The court denied
recovery because of a purpose and two and one-half hour time deviation. Speidel v.
Kellum, 340 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1960); Detour of two and one-half miles was
a material deviation and resulted in denial of coverage. Sauriolle v. O'Gorman,
86 N.H. 39, 163 At. 717 (1932): Master held not liable when servant deviated
one-half mile for his own purpose. Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 P.2d 55
(1932): Employee given permission to use car for one-half hour to do some shopping.
Four hours after receiving possession of car, while driving her mother from a park
to her home, the employee was involved in an accident. The court held that she was
not covered under the "omnibus clause." Collins v. New York Cas. Co., 140 W. Va.
1, 82 S.E.2d 288 (1954): In adopting the "minor deviation rule," the court held
that the permittee's use was nonpermissive when he was responsible for a purpose
deviation and a four and one-half hour time deviation. Boehringer v. Continental
C-9s. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 201, 96 N.W.2d 353 (1959): Employee was given permission
to drive truck on route between employer's plant and a paper mill approximately
six-hundred feet away. He used truck to go home to pick up his lunch and on the
way back, when he was eight or nine blocks from the company, he had an accident.
The court held his use of the truck was nonpermissive.
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The court's decision, in adopting the "Minor Deviation Rule,"
is sound; although this rule is criticized for being subject to uncertainty, it avoids the harsh results of the "Conversion Rule" and
the abuses of the "Liberal Rule," and it is more in accord with the
intentions of the parties. The propriety of the court's decision in
holding the deviation in the present case to be minor is supported
by the authorities.? Most of the cases holding a time deviation to
be nonpermissive involve much longer periods of time, or else they
have the support of additional deviations in purpose and geographical limits."
The significance of this case lies in the fact that it is a case
of first impression in Colorado on the question of deviation from
permissive use; that is, deviation in time, purpose, or geographical
limits as distinguished from the question involved where the permittee
delegates the use of the vehicle to a third person.' Whether the
Colorado state courts will follow this case remains to be seen. For
the present, however, the "Minor Deviation Rule" appears to be
in effect in the Colorado Federal District Court, and that court has
definitely adopted the "permissive use" test rather than the "scope
of employment" test to determine coverage under public automobile
liability insurance policies.
Lester D. Bailey

PROBATE -

JURISDICTION -

DISINTERMENT -

THE

Dis-

TRICT COURT HAS STATEWIDE JURISDICTION IN PROBATE MATTERS
TO ALLOW DISINTERMENT IN A PROPER CASE.

Beere v. Miller, 403

P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
A husband and wife were killed in an automobile accident. The
wife's will, containing a clause leaving Texas property held in joint
tenancy with her husband to her husband, if he survived her, was
filed for probate. The sons and only heirs of the husband filed a
petition in the probate court for an order to exhume the body of
their stepmother along with an affidavit from a pathologist indicating that an autopsy could determine how long each survived
after the accident. The trial court dismissed the petition. The sons
sought relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the district court
to exercise its proper jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
finding that the sons were proper parties, had standing in the
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22

Ewing v. Colorado Farm Mut. Cas. Co., 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956).
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estate, and had an interest in the distribution of the property in the
estate, held that the district court had state-wide jurisdiction to issue
the order for disinterment and ordered that mandamus issue.1
Prior to the adoption of the new judicial amendment of 1965,2
county courts had original jurisdiction in all matters of probate3 and
this jurisdiction was construed to be limited." The judicial amendment of 1965, article VI, section 9 provides: "The district courts
shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction and shall
have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases
Subsequent to similar changes in their judicial structures, some
states have held that in exercising probate jurisdiction, a court of
general jurisdiction does not have general powers, but only those
powers formerly exercised by county courts sitting in probate.' Because probate jurisdiction of county courts in Colorado was construed
to be limited,' the effect of the fusion of probate jurisdiction with
the district court's general jurisdiction seemed unclear. Beere v.
Miller, however, specifically resolved any doubts concerning the
probate jurisdiction of the district courts when it said, "[Ilt is to be
noted that the petition . . . was filed subsequent to the effective
date of . . . Article VI, section 9. The matter being then before
the district court, that court has state-wide jurisdiction to issue
orders of the kind sought here."' Therefore, although the Beere
case could have interpreted the constitutional amendment as having
no effect upon the limited nature of probate jurisdiction, the court
instead held that the general jurisdiction of the district court extends
to matters of probate under the new amendment.
Although in Beere the court was presented with only a jurisI Beere v. Miller, 403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
2 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
8

COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23:

County courts shall be courts of record and shall have original jurisdiction
in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, appointment of guardians, conservators and administrators, and settlement of their
accounts, and such other civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred
by law; provided, such courts shall not have jurisdiction in any case where
the debt, damage, or claim or value of property involved shall exceed two
thousand dollars, except in cases relating to the estates of deceased persons.
4 Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952) ; Wright v. Wright, 11
Colo. App. 470, 53 Pac. 684 (1898); Marshall v. Marshall, 11 Colo. App. 505,
53 Pac. 617 (1898).
SIn re Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 69 Pac. 412 (1902) ; In re Sprigg's
Estate, 68
42 6
Mont. 92, 216 Pac. 1108 (1923); SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE p.
(1946).
6 Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952); Wright v. Wright, 11

Colo. App. 470, 53 Pac. 684 (1898); Marshall v. Marshall, I1 Colo. App. 505,
53 Pac. 617 (1898).
7 403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
8 Id. at 863.
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dictional question, strong dictum would indicate that exhumation
would be proper in such a case. The court stated that,
Without the evidence which they [the sons] seek to present to the
court they may be deprived of their interest in the Texas property

in which they have some claim. The extent of their interest would
depend upon the question of survivorship, and the evidence on
this vital issue is necessary for the court to make proper distribution under the will.

The only apparent reason for the court to make the above-quoted
statement would have been to express its approval of disinterment.
The court, supplying the rationale for allowing disinterment, believed that a determination of which spouse survived was a vital
issue and that justice demanded that exhumation be ordered to make
proper distribution for the estate. After supplying the propriety for
issuing the order for disinterment, the court stated that, "[the district] court has state-wide jurisdiction to issue orders of the kind
sought here,"" indicating that a district court sitting in probate has
the power to order a body exhumed and an autopsy performed.
There has never been a reported Colorado case in which the
power of a court to exhume a body for evidentiary purposes has
been in issue. However, other jurisdictions have recognized that
after its interment the body is in the custody of the law, and a
disturbance of its resting place and its removal is subject to the
control and direction of a court of equity in any case properly
before it.'2
Although the power of a court to order disinterment and autopsy or examination for evidential purposes has been denied in a
few cases,' 3 it has been recognized in many more." The power to
9 ibid.
10

Ibid.

11Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928) ("A
dead human body, once buried is the custody of the law ..
").
2
' Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 Atl. 745 (1928)
'("[Aind removal and disturbance of such body is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court of equity .
) ; Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705 (1921).
3 Tsaraclis v. Characklis, 176 Md. 28, 3 A.2d 725 (1939) (An orphan's court was held
not to have authority to order a grave opened for inspection to determine whether
charges for burial were excessive. It is to be noted, however, that the basis for the
decision was that the orphan's court was one of specified powers and this power was
not within those specified.) ; Homes v. New York, 180 Misc. 364, 42 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1943) ; Crispo v. St. Mary's Cemetery Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1940); In re Dinkel & Jewell Co., 198 N.Y.S. 831 (1923); Danahy v. Kellogg,
70 Misc. 25, 126 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (1910) ("This is the first application of this
kind ever made, so far as we are aware. We are of the opinion the application of
the defendant should be denied; but, in denying the motion, we base our decision
squarely upon the absence of any right or authority in the court to grant the inspection asked.").
14The question of the right to exhume a body for the purpose of discovery is covered
in the annotations at 21 A.L.R.2d 538 (1952).
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order disinterment has been recognized to ascertain the cause of
7
death, 5 to determine the nature of injuries,"' to determine heirship,"
and generally to determine any material facts in litigation." However, the court will refuse to exercise the power where a proper case
A proper case is made out when
for its exercise is not made out.'
fraud is involved," when every
that
believe
to
there is strong reason
2
other method of obtaining the evidence has been exhausted, " when
the issue in question can be proven or disproven by an examination
of the body,' when that issue is material and can be proven or refuted by no other evidence,23 and when justice demands that the
order should be made. 4 However, there is no universal rule to
determine the propriety of issuing the order; each case depends
upon its own facts and circumstances.' Perhaps Professor Wigmore
most aptly states the propriety of ordering disinterment when he
reasons that,
The exhumation or the autopsy of a corpse, when useful to ascertain
facts in litigation, should of course be performed. Reverence for
the memory of those who have departed does not require us to
abdicate the higher duty of doing justice to the living; and the

order of a court of justice, exercising the power of the state in the
communal interest, are not to be placed on the same level with

15 Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Painter v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 Ad. 158 (1914); Kusky
v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (1950); Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v.
Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928).
16 Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (1950).
' Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178
Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); In re Percival, 101 S.C. 198, 85 S.E. 247
(1915).
18 State v. Wood, 127 Me. 197, 142 Atl. 728 (1928); Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178 Neb.
109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142
Pac. 472 (1914).
19 Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928) (good
cause and urgent necessity for the exhumation of the body and an autopsy did not
exist) ; State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472, 474 (1914)
(Where no strong showing is made that the facts sought would be established by
an examination of such body it will be refused.).
20
Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Grangers' Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 57 Miss. 308, 34 Am. Rep. 446 (1879).
21 Ullendorff v. Brown, ibid.; Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, ibid.; Crispo v. St.
Mary's Cemetery Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N.Y.S. 70 (1940); State ex rel.
Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472 (1914).
22
Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945); Stastny v. Tachovsky,
178 Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74
A.2d 546 (1950).
2 Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 57 Miss. 308, 34 Am. Rep. 446 (1879); State
ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472 (1914).
24
Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Painter v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 At. 158 (1914); Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v.
Brown, ibid.; Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178 Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964): Kuskv
v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (15 0; In re D..ke. & Te-....
N.Y.S. 831 (1923) ; State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, ibid.
25Bunol v. Bunol, 12 La. App. 675, 127 So. 70 (1930); Lavigne v. Wilkinson, 80
N.H. 221, 116 Atl. 32 (1921) ; Moore v. Sheafer, 282 Pa. 360, 127 At. 784 (1925).
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the acts of an unlicensed and self-seeking intruder upon hallowed
ground.2
Beere v. Miller27 also contains an interesting procedural issue

which the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McWilliams points out.
To avail themselves of discovery under Rule 34 of the Colorado

Rules of Civil Procedure,28 the petitioners must be parties to the
probate proceeding. 9 Generally one becomes a party to a probate
proceeding by being named in the petition for probate" or by filing
a caveat to the will.31 Of course, one could also become a party

by intervening in the probate proceeding. 2 The contention of the
dissenting opinion is that instead of availing themselves of any of
the above procedures, the petitioners merely alleged in their petition to exhume that they were interested parties.
The majority opinion did not discuss this procedural point and
held that the petitioners were proper parties to the proceeding. The

majority may have reasoned that a probate proceeding is a proceeding in rem in which any interested party may take part.33 Considering the fact that a person in interest is defined by statute" as an
"heir, legatee, devisee, spouse, and his personal representative, and
creditor, or any other person having a property right in or claim
against the estate of a decedent ... ," it is obvious that the petitioners met the requirements since they qualify as "any other person
having a property right." The majority noted,
If, therefore, the evidence sought by these petitioners established
that their father survived their stepmother, title to the property
would vest in him as a surviving joint tenant and petitioners would
have an interest in either the entirety of the property or possibly in
6 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2221 at 197 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of rule 30(b), the court
in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and,
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted under rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control....
2 Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1940)
(Rule 34 authorizing production of documents and things for inspection, is limited
to parties) ; Park Bridge Corp. v. Elias, 3 F.R.D. 93 (D.N.Y. 1943).
30
COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-22 (1963); PARKS, COLORADO PROBATE PRACTICE
MANUAL § 4.5 at 75 (1964) ; "It would appear that the petition for probate functions as the complaint, that the caveat is the answer ... "
28

§ 153-5-33 (1963) ; PARKS, op. cit. supra note 30, § 4.5 (1964).
32 COLO. R. Civ. P. 24.
33
Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS
§ 95 at 493 (1953) ; 43 MICH. L. REV. 675 (1945).
34
COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-1-1 (12) (1963).
31 COLO. REV. STAT.
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one-half thereof, either by Texas law or under the terms of the
will.35

The majority also may have taken into consideration the fact
that the executor seems to have erred in not serving notice upon the
petitioners as heirs of a devisee which would have made them parties.
The executor was apparently acting under the erroneous assumption
that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 6 was controlling. This
act obviously does not control when there is sufficent evidence to
determine which person survived."
Evidence sufficent to controvert the applicability of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, thus enabling the district court to
make a proper distribution under the will, would be contingent upon
the exhumation and autopsy of the decedent's remains within a
comparatively short period of time following her death. The urgency
inherent in this situation may well have been an additional factor
in the court's dispensing with strict adherence to the procedural
rules.
In holding that district courts have probate jurisdiction as part
of their general jurisdiction, the Beere decision has reached an
excellent result. Mr. Howard Parks in his Colorado Probate Practice
Manual seems to have predicted this result stating that "there appears to be no probability that the supreme court will reduce the
district courts to courts of limited jurisdiction when sitting in probate,
as has occurred in some states.'"'" Mrs. Parks also believes that, [Tihe
revised judiciary structure of the state will eliminate many of the
problems which existed heretofore because the county courts were
courts of limited jurisdiction."3 This contention seems to be upheld by the situation presented in the Beere case. A county court
with limited jurisdiction could not exhume a body located in another county while a district court, having state-wide jurisdiction, is
able to order exhumation incident to a probate proceeding. Thus, a
district court sitting in probate could receive evidence needed for
a proper distribution of the estate.
It would seem that the Beere case could be cited with confidence
as an example of approval by the Supreme Court of Colorado of
disinterment for evidentiary purposes when a proper case is before
it. As has been pointed out, other jurisdictions have recognized the
power of a court to order disinterment for evidentiary purposes and
35403 P.2d 862, 863 (Colo. 1965).
36 COLO.R V. STAT. §§ 153-18-1 to -8.
37

38

Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).
PARKS, op. cit. supra note 30, § 1.9 at 7 (1964).

39Ibid.
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now it seems that there is also a Colorado case which could be used
as precedent for the exercise of such a power.
Although the majority of the court did not discuss the procedural
point highlighted in the dissenting opinion, it would seem, at least
by implication, that liberal procedures in probate courts could be
followed. The majority apparently believed that any interested person could become a party to a probate proceeding by alleging an interest in the estate and showing that his interest may be adversely
affected. It should be noted that the petitioners in the Beere case
did not become parties to the probate proceeding by being named
in the petition for probate, nor by filing a caveat, nor by intervening
in the proceeding, but rather by merely alleging their interest in the
petition to exhume. This result follows the principle that probate
procedures are established for the purpose of providing an orderly
manner in which to conduct the administration of estates and should
not be invoked to obstruct this goal.
Ion L. Lawritson

